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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Kelly Conard appeals from the July 12, 2016 
order of dismissal of a civil rights action that she brought under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against her former employer, the Pennsylvania 
State Police, and her former State Police supervisors, Sergeants 
Joseph Tripp and Dennis Hile.  The District Court held that the 
bulk of Conard’s claims were barred because they had been 
adjudicated in a prior action which she initiated after she 
unsuccessfully sought reemployment by the State Police after 
she voluntarily had resigned.  The Court also dismissed her 
separate claim that defendants retaliated against her for having 
filed that prior action by giving her negative employment 
references as it held that the complaint failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will reverse the order dismissing Conard’s First 
Amendment retaliation claim.1 
 
II.  FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 We draw the following facts from Conard’s amended 
complaint which we assume to be true in our consideration of 
the order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss her retaliation 
complaint.  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-
56, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).  The Pennsylvania State 
Police employed Conard for seventeen years as a 911 dispatcher. 
                                                 
1 She raised the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the First 
Amendment but the Fourteenth Amendment claim adds nothing 
to her case so we do not discuss that Amendment further. 
 
  4 
 Conard voluntarily ended her employment in 2002 when she 
moved to Texas to accompany her husband, who was in that 
state on an active military deployment.  When she left her 
employment in 2002, there was documentary evidence showing 
that she had a record of “commendable and outstanding 
personnel evaluations.”  App. 107, ¶ 9.  Nevertheless, the record 
shows that defendants Tripp and Hile, Conard’s direct 
supervisors before she left her State Police employment, and 
Conard had had employment-related disagreements.  The 
substance of these disagreements was at issue in Conard’s 
earlier lawsuit but they are of limited significance on this appeal 
because she can assert a First Amendment retaliation claim to 
bring this action even though her first action was not 
successful.2 
Conard returned to Pennsylvania from Texas in 2004 and 
reapplied for her 911 dispatcher position.  Following an initial 
                                                 
2 Conard’s complaint describes her earlier disagreements with 
the individual defendants as follows.  On one occasion, Conard 
went “over Defendant Hile’s head” to request emergency 
backup officers for an incident involving gunfire, which in 
Conard’s view required extra assistance.  In her view, Hile 
“refus[ed] to take appropriate actions” and, according to Conard, 
her actions in going over his head to secure the backup 
“probably saved a life.”  App. 107, ¶ 11.  Conard’s disagreement 
with Sergeant Tripp related to her request that she be allowed to 
take a sick day when she was involved in an automobile 
accident which Tripp denied.  Conard alleges that Tripp’s denial 
was unreasonable and she claims that Tripp subsequently 
restricted her use of sick leave even though Conard never had 
requested excessive leave.   
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interview, the State Police told Conard that she would be hired 
subject to a background check.  But the result of the background 
check ultimately led the State Police not to make her an offer of 
employment.  Conard alleges that she was told that information 
from her former supervisors, Hile and Tripp, caused the State 
Police to reject her application.  Id. 
 
Conard believed that the denial of her 2004 application 
for employment was discriminatory and was the result of Hile’s 
and Tripp’s retaliation against her because of disagreements 
between Conard and them during her previous employment with 
the State Police.  Consequently, she filed an administrative 
charge of discrimination with the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission alleging discrimination based on gender.3  Then on 
July 24, 2006, Conard filed her initial civil rights action in the 
district court against the Pennsylvania State Police, Hile and 
Tripp charging that they discriminated and retaliated against her 
because of the previous employment disputes.  The court 
referred the matter to a magistrate judge who filed a report and 
recommendation that the court should dismiss Conard’s action.  
The court accepted the recommendation and dismissed the 
action.4  Conard appealed but we affirmed in an unpublished 
opinion.  Conard v. Pennsylvania State Police, 360 F. App’x 337 
(3d Cir. 2010).  
 
                                                 
3 She does not raise a gender discrimination issue on this appeal. 
  
4 We need not go into detail about the basis for the court’s 
decision. 
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 Conard alleges that in the years following the filing of 
her initial action and up to the time that the record was closed in 
this case, she has been unable to obtain employment.  She claims 
that defendants have given prospective employers “negative, 
false, and defamatory” statements in response to reference 
requests.  App. 112, ¶ 33, 35.  She further asserts that the 
individual defendants told Conard’s prospective employers “that 
[Conard] had attendance issues, absence issues, and had filed a 
law suit against them and that [she] was not eligible to return” to 
the State Police.  App. 114, ¶ 40.  Conard claims that these 
statements do not accurately reflect her exemplary record as a 
State Police employee and that defendants knowingly made 
these false statements in retaliation for Conard having filed the 
prior federal lawsuit.  Conard also alleges that on at least one 
occasion, in response to an employment reference request, a 
representative of the State Police falsely represented that the 
State Police never had employed Conard. 
 
 Conard filed this second action pro se in 2015, alleging 
that defendants retaliated against her in violation of her First 
Amendment rights for having brought her initial action.  
Defendants in response filed a motion to dismiss.  The District 
Court once again referred the matter to a magistrate judge who 
filed a report and recommendation that the Court grant 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.  The Court adopted that 
recommendation and dismissed the action for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.5  Conard 
unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and then appealed. 
                                                 
5 The magistrate judge recommended that Conard be directed to 
file a more definite statement but the District Court did not 
adopt that portion of the recommendation.  The definitive 
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On this appeal, Conard moved for in forma pauperis 
status, which we granted.  In our order we instructed the parties 
to brief two issues, in addition to any others they wished to raise, 
relating to the proper standard applicable to this First 
Amendment action:  
 
(1) whether the public-employment framework 
applies to a former employee under the 
circumstances of this case, cf. Williams v. Town 
of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 76-77 (2d Cir. 
2008); Benson v. Scott, 734 F.2d 1181, 1186 (7th 
Cir. 1984); and (2) whether a plaintiff must plead 
adverse action ‘of a particularly virulent 
character,’ McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 
573 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Mirabella v. Villard, 
853 F.3d 641, 651 (3d Cir. 2017), when claiming 
retaliation in the form of a public employer’s 





III.  JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1334.  We have jurisdiction to review the dismissal of 
plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de 
novo review over the dismissal of Conard’s complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Schmidt v. 
Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 248 (2014).  In this motion to dismiss 
                                                                                                             
statement matter is not an issue on this appeal. 
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context, we “are required to accept as true all allegations in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
[the allegations] after construing them in the light most 
favorable to the non-movant.”  Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, 
O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted).  The parties in their briefs have addressed the issues 




IV.  DISCUSSION 
 We begin by clarifying the applicable First Amendment 
legal standard in two respects.  First, we conclude that the 
framework for First Amendment claims brought by government 
employees against their employers does not apply to Conard’s 
retaliation claim, because the speech which Conard alleges 
triggered the retaliation against her—filing administrative 
complaints6 and a lawsuit against her former employer—
occurred after she had left her State Police employment.  The 
public-employment framework exists to accommodate the 
competing interests of public employees to speak freely and the 
government’s need to regulate the speech of its own employees. 
 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-18, 126 S. Ct. 
1951, 1957-58 (2006) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. 
High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968)).  But 
once Conard left her State Police employment, it did not have a 
protectable interest in controlling Conard’s speech.  Therefore, 
the public-employment framework does not apply to her claim.  
See Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 
                                                 
6 The administrative complaints are a secondary matter so we do 
not mention them further. 
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2008) (declining to apply public-employment framework to 
retaliation claim brought by former government employee).7 
Second, in the context of this action, Conard was not 
required to plead that defendants engaged in retaliatory conduct 
“of a particularly virulent character,” a standard applicable to 
retaliation claims where the retaliatory conduct involves speech 
by a public employee defendant.  See McLaughlin v. Watson, 
271 F.3d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 2001).  Of course, we recognize that 
absent particularly virulent conduct, an official’s speech 
ordinarily does not amount to a retaliatory act for First 
Amendment purposes.  Id. at 573.  But where a defendant public 
official’s alleged retaliation takes the form of the official’s own 
speech, we have noted that the official’s First Amendment rights 
countervailing to the employee’s rights become implicated, and 
this leads us to apply a less demanding but more specific test to 
survive a motion to dismiss.  Id.  We look instead to the 
defendant’s action to determine whether in that action “there 
was ‘a threat, coercion, or intimidation, intimating that 
                                                 
7  Defendants have argued that Conard’s claims should be 
evaluated under the public-employment framework because she 
is attempting to re-litigate claims that arose while she was an 
employee and were the subject of her earlier lawsuit.  However, 
in her briefs and at oral argument before this Court, Conard 
explicitly has disclaimed any attempt to revive those earlier 
claims.  Accordingly, we base our conclusion that the public-
employment framework does not apply on our understanding 
that Conard has abandoned any claim that would involve speech 
she made while employed by the State Police.  We do not 
consider the question of whether the public-employment 
framework could be applied in post-employment litigation 
involving earlier speech during public employment. 
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punishment, sanction, or adverse regulatory action [would] 
follow.’”  Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 651 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(quoting McLaughlin, 271 F.3d at 573).   
Moreover, courts have not applied the heightened 
virulent character standard in cases where, as here, the official’s 
conduct relates only to a private matter such as the plaintiff’s job 
performance as a former employee.  Thus, in Suarez Corp. 
Industries v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2000), the case on 
which we relied in McLaughlin, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit anticipated that the heightened standard might not 
apply where a defendant’s statements “concerned private 
information about an individual.”  202 F.3d at 689.  
Furthermore, that court has declined to apply the McLaughlin 
virulent character test to cases where the public official’s 
“retaliatory speech discloses private or damaging information 
about the plaintiff.”  Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 
528 n.4 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Balt. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 
F.3d 410, 420 (4th Cir. 2006).   
We have suggested that the virulent character test is 
implicated only where the public official’s speech touches on a 
matter of public concern.  See Muni. Revenue Servs., Inc. v. 
McBlain, 347 F. App’x 817, 824 (3d Cir. 2009) (non-
precedential).  At this point in the proceedings, accepting as true 
Conard’s allegations that defendants repeatedly misrepresented 
her employment history and job performance, applying the 
virulent character test would require us to recognize that 
defendants had a First Amendment interest in their allegedly 
untruthful statements that Conard could overcome only by 
scaling a high barrier.  But because this case does not involve a 
matter of public concern, we decline to interpose the virulent 
character test on this appeal. 
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 Having clarified the applicable standard, we now apply 
the standard we adopt to Conard’s claim that defendants’ 
allegedly false statements to her prospective employers were 
made to retaliate against her for having brought her earlier 
judicial complaint.  The District Court concluded that Conard 
had not adequately pled a causal link between her earlier lawsuit 
and the defendants’ statements because of the long temporal gap 
between those events.  We conclude, however, that dismissal for 
lack of causation was premature and that Conard should be 
afforded the opportunity to develop proof of causation through 
discovery.  While significant time passed between Conard’s 
earlier complaint and the alleged retaliation, there is no bright 
line rule for the time that may pass between protected speech 
and what constitutes actionable retaliation. 
To plead a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, 
Conard was required to allege three elements: (1) “[she engaged 
in] constitutionally protected conduct, (2) [there was] retaliatory 
action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising [her] constitutional rights, and (3) [there was] a 
causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and 
the retaliatory action.”  Mirabella, 853 F.3d at 649 (3d Cir. 
2017) (quoting Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 
296 (3d Cir. 2006)).  There is no doubt that Conard’s initiation 
of the first action was constitutionally protected conduct so we 
pass to the other elements.  In considering the causal link 
element on the motion to dismiss, we conclude that Conard 
plausibly has pled that there was a causal link between her 
conduct, i.e. initiating the first action, and defendants’ allegedly 
retaliatory action necessary to support her claim.  See Miller v. 
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 153 (3d Cir. 2010).  A plaintiff 
sufficiently pleads her case with respect to causation if she 
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pleads that her “constitutionally protected conduct was a 
substantial or motivating factor” for the retaliatory conduct.  
Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016).  While 
“unusually suggestive” timing can provide evidence of 
causation, causation also can be shown “from the evidence 
gleaned from the record as a whole.”  Id. at 424.  Conard can 
attempt to show retaliation through a “pattern of antagonism” in 
addition to the timing of events.  Id. at 422. 
 
 The magistrate judge in this second case in 
recommending that the District Court make a finding that 
Conard had not adequately pled causation, relied on a group of 
cases for the proposition that causation may be implied by 
temporal proximity only if the alleged retaliation follows the 
protected conduct within a number of days, rather than weeks or 
months.  However, those cases largely involved summary 
judgment proceedings where the plaintiff had had an 
opportunity to marshal evidence and had chosen to rely on 
circumstantial evidence to prove causation based on the timing 
of events.   
 
By contrast, at the motion to dismiss stage, the District 
Court was obliged to accept Conard’s factual allegations as true 
and to draw reasonable inferences regarding causation in her 
favor.  After all, her allegations do not lack plausibility.  In 
general, there is not a bright line rule limiting the length of time 
that may pass between a plaintiff’s protected speech and an 
actionable retaliatory act by a defendant.  See Coszalter v. City 
of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (cautioning that “a 
specified time period cannot be a mechanically applied 
criterion”).  While obviously we take no position on the truth or 
falsity of Conard’s claims, we are constrained to reverse the 
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dismissal of the retaliation claim because, to the extent that the 
Court found that causation could not be proven because of the 
passage of time between Conard’s protected conduct, i.e., 
bringing her initial action, and the retaliation, that conclusion 
was premature at the motion to dismiss stage. 
 
In addition, the District Court held that negative 
references cannot constitute retaliation, and in doing so relied on 
a single Title VII case, Chinoy v. Pa. State Univ., No. 11-cv-
1263, 2013 WL 6631536, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2013).  
However, the question of whether a negative reference would be 
enough to satisfy the “deterrence” element of Conard’s claim is 
debatable.  See Brescia v. Sia, No. 07-cv-8054, 2008 WL 
1944010, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2008) (“We have no doubt 
that the prospect of a negative employment reference, which has 
the obvious potential to impede the search for a new job, would 
deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
constitutional rights.”).8  We have held that “First Amendment 
retaliation claims are always individually actionable, even when 
relatively minor” and that the deterrence threshold to chill a 
plaintiff from exercising her First Amendment rights by reason 
of the defendant’s conduct for such a claim is “very low.”  
                                                 
8 We think it appropriate to point out that if a retaliation action 
can be brought against an employer or former employer for 
giving a negative reference the employer may be reluctant to 
give any reference at all at the request of a later potential 
employer but instead will adopt a “no response” policy on 
receiving a reference request.  Therefore, courts should 
scrutinize retaliation cases based on negative references with 
great care, particularly if the employer moves for summary 
judgment in such an action. 
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O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127-28 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Based on this standard, Conard adequately alleged 
retaliatory conduct by defendants that satisfies the deterrence 
prong of her First Amendment claim as set forth in Mirabella.  
Therefore, her retaliation complaint satisfies all three elements 
of the Mirabella test and the Court should not have dismissed it 




V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons above, we will reverse the District 
Court’s July 12, 2016 order granting defendants’ motion to 
dismiss and will remand the case to that Court for further 
proceedings on Conard’s First Amendment retaliation claim.  
On the remand, Conard should have the opportunity to conduct 
appropriate discovery and to present evidence establishing the 
causal connection between her protected First Amendment 
conduct and the alleged retaliation by defendants.  Of course, 
defendants also should have the right to discovery on the 
remand.  Finally, we thank Conard’s attorneys on this appeal for 
having represented her in a fine way on a pro bono basis. 
